Bitcoin Client Accounting - FEDEC

Craig Wright provably defrauded the court when he claimed that a bonded courier had showed up with a list of public addresses asserting what Bitcoin he owned in the Tulip Trust. Andreas Antonopoulos' report explains the proof. Steve Shadders HAS to realise he's been fooled at this point.

Background: Craig has been ordered to submit a list of all the Bitcoin addresses he owned several times now. The first time he was given a hard deadline by Magistrate Judge Reinhart and simply ignored it. Then, in a last ditch effort to escape contempt of court and/or sanctions Craig Wright asked the CTO of his company nChain, Steve Shadders to spend 2 weeks putting together a list of Bitcoin he thinks belongs to Satoshi, based on statistical criteria that just happened to match the well-known Patoshi pattern analysis. While replicating existing Blockchain research over a space of two weeks as his top-priority, nChain CTO Steve Shadders managed to include a bug that resulted in 1749 addresses that don't match the Patoshi pattern. This is going to be important later, so keep it in mind.
The court wasn't happy with this last ditch, buggy, probabilistic attempt at producing the addresses he was commanded to produce, but they were especially unhappy with the litany of provable forgeries, perjurious statements, and evasive and dishonest testimonies from Wright that was impeding discovery and Judge Reinhart administered case-ending sanctions against Mr. Wright in response.
Judge Bloom overturned Reinhart's sanctions, though she explicitly agreed with Reinhart's credibility findings regarding Wright. She offered Craig a poisoned chalice:
In light of the Defendant's representations that the bonded courier is scheduled to arrive in January 2020, the Court will permit the Defendant through and including February 3, 2020, to file a notice with the court indicating whether or not this mysterious figure has appeared from the shadows and whether the Defendant now has access to the last key slice needed to unlock the encrypted file. In the event this occurs, and further if the Defendant produces his list of Bitcoin Holdings as ordered by the Magistrate Judge, then this Court will not impose any additional sanctions other than the ones discussed above.
With the not so subtle implication being that Bloom did not believe Craig's invocations of a "mysterious bonded courier" and that if he failed to satisfy this burden additional sanctions would be forthcoming.
Mr. Wright apparently took this as a forgery challenge, only one where he didn't have much respect for the intellect of his adversaries.
In his report Andreas Antonopoulos labels four separate files of Bitcoin lists, Shadders List, CW, DK, and CSW Filed.
Shadders List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Shadders produced with a bug he disclosed that caused the least significant byte of some of the nonces for the Coinbases to fall outside of the range 0-58 (the Patoshi pattern that's been used to identify Satoshi's Bitcoin), referred to as the Shadders Bug (this bug is discussed more here).
CW List: A list of Wright's Bitcoin the Trust produced during settlement negotiations
DK List: A list of Dave Kleiman's Bitcoin the trust produced during settlement negotiations.
CSW Filed List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Craig allegedly receive from the bonded courier and then filed with the court in time to attempt to escape sanctions.
Bullet points:
submitted by Zectro to btc [link] [comments]

Latest doc updates: the list of addresses the bonded courier coughed up is an obvious forgery, Craig Wright is dumber than many of us thought possible, and Steve Shadders, if he looks at the data from Andreas' report HAS to realise at this point that he's been bamboozled

Background: Craig has been ordered to submit a list of all the Bitcoin addresses he owned several times now. The first time he was given a hard deadline by Magistrate Judge Reinhart and simply ignored it. Then, in a last ditch effort to escape contempt of court and/or sanctions Craig Wright asked the CTO of his company nChain, Steve Shadders to spend 2 weeks putting together a list of Bitcoin he thinks belongs to Satoshi, based on statistical criteria that just happened to match the well-known Patoshi pattern analysis. While replicating existing Blockchain research over a space of two weeks as his top-priority, nChain CTO Steve Shadders managed to include a bug that resulted in 1749 addresses that don't match the Patoshi pattern. This is going to be important later, so keep it in mind.
The court wasn't happy with this last ditch, buggy, probabilistic attempt at producing the addresses he was commanded to produce, but they were especially unhappy with the litany of provable forgeries, perjurious statements, and evasive and dishonest testimonies from Wright that was impeding discovery and Judge Reinhart administered case-ending sanctions against Mr. Wright in response.
Judge Bloom overturned Reinhart's sanctions, though she explicitly agreed with Reinhart's credibility findings regarding Wright. She offered Craig a poisoned chalice:
In light of the Defendant's representations that the bonded courier is scheduled to arrive in January 2020, the Court will permit the Defendant through and including February 3, 2020, to file a notice with the court indicating whether or not this mysterious figure has appeared from the shadows and whether the Defendant now has access to the last key slice needed to unlock the encrypted file. In the event this occurs, and further if the Defendant produces his list of Bitcoin Holdings as ordered by the Magistrate Judge, then this Court will not impose any additional sanctions other than the ones discussed above.
With the not so subtle implication being that Bloom did not believe Craig's invocations of a "mysterious bonded courier" and that if he failed to satisfy this burden additional sanctions would be forthcoming.
Mr. Wright apparently took this as a forgery challenge, only one where he didn't have much respect for the intellect of his adversaries.
In his report Andreas Antonopoulos labels four separate files of Bitcoin lists, Shadders List, CW, DK, and CSW Filed.
Shadders List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Shadders produced with a bug he disclosed that caused the least significant byte of some of the nonces for the Coinbases to fall outside of the range 0-58 (the Patoshi pattern that's been used to identify Satoshi's Bitcoin), referred to as the Shadders Bug (this bug is discussed more here).
CW List: A list of Wright's Bitcoin the Trust produced during settlement negotiations
DK List: A list of Dave Kleiman's Bitcoin the trust produced during settlement negotiations.
CW Filed List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Craig allegedly receive from the bonded courier and then filed with the court in time to attempt to escape sanctions.
Bullet points:
submitted by Zectro to bsv [link] [comments]

Nakamoto Dundee provably defrauded the court and a Federal Judge on the matter of the Tulip Trust and his Buttcoin holdings therein, immediately after she lifted his sanctions for repeatedly defrauding a Magistrate Judge on that same matter.

Background: Craig has been ordered to submit a list of all the Bitcoin addresses he owned several times now. The first time he was given a hard deadline by Magistrate Judge Reinhart and simply ignored it. Then, in a last ditch effort to escape contempt of court and/or sanctions Craig Wright asked the CTO of his company nChain, Steve Shadders to spend 2 weeks putting together a list of Bitcoin he thinks belongs to Satoshi, based on statistical criteria Craig gave him that just happened to match the well-known Patoshi pattern analysis. While replicating existing Blockchain research over a space of two weeks as his top-priority, nChain CTO Steve Shadders managed to include a bug that resulted in 1749 addresses that don't match the Patoshi pattern. This is going to be important later, so keep it in mind.
The court wasn't happy with this last ditch, buggy, probabilistic attempt at producing the addresses he was commanded to produce, but they were especially unhappy with the litany of provable forgeries, perjurious statements, and evasive and dishonest testimonies from Wright that was impeding discovery and Judge Reinhart administered case-ending sanctions against Mr. Wright in response.
Judge Bloom overturned Reinhart's sanctions, though she explicitly agreed with Reinhart's credibility findings regarding Wright. She offered Craig a poisoned chalice:
In light of the Defendant's representations that the bonded courier is scheduled to arrive in January 2020, the Court will permit the Defendant through and including February 3, 2020, to file a notice with the court indicating whether or not this mysterious figure has appeared from the shadows and whether the Defendant now has access to the last key slice needed to unlock the encrypted file. In the event this occurs, and further if the Defendant produces his list of Bitcoin Holdings as ordered by the Magistrate Judge, then this Court will not impose any additional sanctions other than the ones discussed above.
With the not so subtle implication being that Bloom did not believe Craig's invocations of a "mysterious bonded courier" and that if he failed to satisfy this burden additional sanctions would be forthcoming.
Mr. Wright apparently took this as a forgery challenge, only one where he didn't have much respect for the intellect of his adversaries.
In his report Andreas Antonopoulos labels four separate files of Bitcoin lists, Shadders List, CW, DK, and CSW Filed.
Shadders List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Shadders produced with a bug he disclosed that caused the least significant byte of some of the nonces for the Coinbases to fall outside of the range 0-58 (the Patoshi pattern that's been used to identify Satoshi's Bitcoin), referred to as the Shadders Bug (this bug is discussed more here).
CW List: A list of Wright's Bitcoin the Trust produced during settlement negotiations
DK List: A list of Dave Kleiman's Bitcoin the trust produced during settlement negotiations.
CW Filed List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Craig allegedly receive from the bonded courier and then filed with the court in time to attempt to escape sanctions.
Bullet points:
submitted by Zectro to Buttcoin [link] [comments]

Latest CSW court doc updates: Andreas Antonopoulos shows the list of addresses the bonded courier coughed up is an obvious forgery, Craig Wright is dumber than many of us thought possible, and Steve Shadders, if he looks at the report HAS to realise at this point that he's been bamboozled

Background: Craig has been ordered to submit a list of all the Bitcoin addresses he owned several times now. The first time he was given a hard deadline by Magistrate Judge Reinhart and simply ignored it. Then, in a last ditch effort to escape contempt of court and/or sanctions Craig Wright asked the CTO of his company nChain, Steve Shadders to spend 2 weeks putting together a list of Bitcoin he thinks belongs to Satoshi, based on statistical criteria that just happened to match the well-known Patoshi pattern analysis. While replicating existing Blockchain research over a space of two weeks as his top-priority, nChain CTO Steve Shadders managed to include a bug that resulted in 1749 addresses that don't match the Patoshi pattern. This is going to be important later, so keep it in mind.
The court wasn't happy with this last ditch, buggy, probabilistic attempt at producing the addresses he was commanded to produce, but they were especially unhappy with the litany of provable forgeries, perjurious statements, and evasive and dishonest testimonies from Wright that was impeding discovery and Judge Reinhart administered case-ending sanctions against Mr. Wright in response.
Judge Bloom overturned Reinhart's sanctions, though she explicitly agreed with Reinhart's credibility findings regarding Wright. She offered Craig a poisoned chalice:
In light of the Defendant's representations that the bonded courier is scheduled to arrive in January 2020, the Court will permit the Defendant through and including February 3, 2020, to file a notice with the court indicating whether or not this mysterious figure has appeared from the shadows and whether the Defendant now has access to the last key slice needed to unlock the encrypted file. In the event this occurs, and further if the Defendant produces his list of Bitcoin Holdings as ordered by the Magistrate Judge, then this Court will not impose any additional sanctions other than the ones discussed above.
With the not so subtle implication being that Bloom did not believe Craig's invocations of a "mysterious bonded courier" and that if he failed to satisfy this burden additional sanctions would be forthcoming.
Mr. Wright apparently took this as a forgery challenge, only one where he didn't have much respect for the intellect of his adversaries.
In his report Andreas Antonopoulos labels four separate files of Bitcoin lists, Shadders List, CW, DK, and CSW Filed.
Shadders List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Shadders produced with a bug he disclosed that caused the least significant byte of some of the nonces for the Coinbases to fall outside of the range 0-58 (the Patoshi pattern that's been used to identify Satoshi's Bitcoin), referred to as the Shadders Bug (this bug is discussed more here).
CW List: A list of Wright's Bitcoin the Trust produced during settlement negotiations
DK List: A list of Dave Kleiman's Bitcoin the trust produced during settlement negotiations.
CW Filed List: The list of Wright's Bitcoin Craig allegedly receive from the bonded courier and then filed with the court in time to attempt to escape sanctions.
Bullet points:
submitted by Zectro to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

BetHash - How Provably Fair Isn't as Fair as it Looks

BetHash - How Provably Fair Isn't as Fair as it Looks
https://preview.redd.it/sm725nui67441.png?width=1020&format=png&auto=webp&s=20a9e7ff2f304064facd7be546e1f0ec2548daee
In our previous post, we took a look at how Bethash uses an entirely new system to prove fairness, as compared to cryptocurrency casinos that use an older system, known as ‘provably fair’.
In this article, we will explore the practicality of an absolutely fair casino and identify some of the flaws that exist in the provably fair system. These issues, in addition to some other limitations of the technology, are what prompted the BetHash team to begin using blockchain-based provable fairness.

Quick Recap on Fairness: 3 versus 21

If you remember correctly, our previous article explained the basics of how the provably fair system works. The provably fair system works because of 3 components: the server seed, client seed, and the nonce.
Now, for the sake of argument, if any two of these three components are compromised, then the security of the provably fair system breaks down. We will get into the specifics of how this might occur in the next section.
The way BetHash differs here is in fact of a simple numbers game. Instead of relying on three components as per typical provably fair casinos, BethHash relies on the 21 block producers of the EOS blockchain network.
As we have previously explained, the EOS network has a decentralized network of 21 block producers that secure the blockchain network against mutability. If you were to somehow trying to alter the results of BetHash, you would first have to first corrupt at least 11 of the 21 EOS block producers, which is a practically impossible task, since each block producer is voted into position by tens of thousands of EOS users.
Because of this, subvert even one of the EOS block producers is a nigh-impossible task, since every EOS block producer is a well-known, reputable force in the EOS community.

How is the Provably Fair System Corruptible?

The answer to this question lies more in human error and human nature rather than the technology itself. The implementation of the provably fair system differs from casino to casino, which can mean different casinos have loopholes not present in most others.
Then comes the concept of a Zero-day attack. Consider this; the first generation of online casinos used random number generators (RNGs) to ensure fairness until it was discovered that RNGs were not secured enough. This was primarily due to the faulty implementation of the number generation algorithm. A great example is this case, where one person was able to accurately figure out how the cards were being shuffled in an online poker game, despite them being arranged using random numbers.
A Zero-day attack can be defined as the exploitation of faulty code or faulty implementation of a perfectly fine code despite the implementor (in this case, a casino) knowing about this vulnerability. With this in mind, let's take a look at two examples of how a provably fair system could have hidden vulnerabilities:

Example 1: Nonce overflow

This vulnerability has to do with a faulty way of storing the nonce in an unsecured unsigned integer variable. This could, in turn, lead the nonce variable to overflow after a certain number of bets have been made and cause it to return 0, resulting in every future roll to become predictable.
For a detailed explanation of how a Nonce overflow flaw works, visit this article.

Example 2: Force-It Box

In this second example, one programmer was able to detect two vulnerabilities in the way the provably fair system was implemented by one bitcoin dice site. First, the programmer discovered that there was no way for the client-side seed to be entered in the roll, which meant the website could still manipulate the results.
But the second and the bigger vulnerability was caused by the fact that the starting seed was exposed, giving anyone with enough gusto the ability to brute force the encryption and predict all the rolls.
For a detailed overview of how the Force-It Box vulnerability works, visit this GitHub post.

In Summary

As you can see, although implementing a provably fair system is certainly a step in the right direction towards fairness, faulty implementations can cause the system to break down. On the other hand, with BetHash you are putting your trust in 21 incorruptible factors (EOS block producers) making BetHash a pioneering endeavor towards the evolution of fairness in online games.
https://preview.redd.it/kbv1rwfh67441.png?width=1080&format=png&auto=webp&s=a79ef3286f81ccfe2a2473ee88ec2335e93c7e8a
Want to receive 100 Bonus Spins to help kick start your epic BetHash journey? Simply click here and follow the instructions to begin.
submitted by bethashio to bethashcasino [link] [comments]

I Created a Custom Lightning Payment Jackpot Website from Scratch, This Is What I Learnt

TL;DR: I wanted to learn how the Lightning Network operates. So I came up with an idea for a jackpot site using the Lightning Network to handle micro-payments. Operating a Lightning node is complicated and challenging for a beginner. Using custodial wallets like Wallet of Satoshi, BlueWallet or Breez is easy to use but not your keys. Please come by and help me test my Lightning integrated new website. I’m happy to help anyone that’s new to Lightning setup a wallet and play a game. It all helps with learning and adoption, that’s why we’re all here! Long Bitcoin, Short the Bankers!

Introduction: Welcome to a brand new concept in random number seeding. Generating a truly random number is quite hard. You could use the current time, divided by the RPM spin of your hard disk, squared by the temperature of your CPU, and so on. Other extreme methods include measuring quantum fluctuations in a vacuum, see ANU Quantum Random Number. All these methods are fine but none of these are really verifiable by a 3rd party. Whoever running the system can change the outcome. I'm not saying they do, simply stating that if the payoff was great enough to alter the 'reported' outcome they could. So what's different here? We're using the Bitcoin blockchain itself as the arbitrator. Every outcome is not only provably fair but verifiably fair and immutable. Trying to cheat this system is impossible.

So that’s the pitch. Make a website using the idea of whoever’s guess is closest, wins the jackpot; using Lightning to handle all the incoming and outgoing payments. I started to look around at other fully functional websites offering Lightning as a payment method. It turns out most use a 3rd party like OpenNode or CoinGate. To me, this defeats the whole purpose of Bitcoin. Why build a website/offer a service/offer Lightning as a payment method if you don’t even own or control your funds. A payment processor could simply turn off withdrawals and it’s over. Not your keys, not your coins!

It’s been quite a learning experience for me. I think the most frustrating thing to figure out and attempt to solve was channel capacity. For example, with a fresh new wallet setup on Bitcoin Lightning for Andriod (blue bolt logo), you can open a channel to anyone fine, but trying to receive money won’t work. I think for a beginneadoption this is the greatest hurdle to understand/overcome.
You need to spend money so the other side has some collateral to send back. One explanation I read was, opening Lightning channels are like a full glass of water, I need to tip some of my water into your empty glass so my glass has some room to fill it back up, it can’t overflow. Another one is like beads on a string. The number of beads is up to you but if all the beads are on your side, the other party can’t push any beats your way because you have them all. There’s ways to fix this. Either spend into the channel or buy incoming channel capacity. On the spend side, you can use websites like lightningconductor.net which allow you to send money to their Lightning node, from your new channel, and they’ll send the coins to your on-chain Bitcoin wallet. This is a simple way to empty your glass or push those beads to the other side and still retain all your money, minus LN and on-chain fees. For incoming capacity, you can use LNBig and get 400k satoshis of incoming capacity for free or lightningto.me, or you can pay lightningpowerusers.com or bitrefill.com to open larger capacity channels to you for a small fee.

For a beginner or someone new to Bitcoin/Lightning, using a custodial wallet like BlueWallet, Wallet of Satosh or Breez is far easier than trying to setup channels and buy or massage incoming capacity. You can simply install the application and using lightningconductor.net BTC to LN you can send some Bitcoin and they’ll forward it on to your lightning wallet, for a fee. These custodial wallets accept incoming transactions of 1 million satoshis or more. So now you’ve got a working wallet that’s got a few thousand satoshis, keep reading!

How to play: Two things are verifiable on the blockchain, time between blocks and transactions included in that block. First choose which block#, by default it will be the next one coming up. Then choose a public alias, others will be able to see your bets but they won’t know if you’ve paid or not, only you can see that. Next, guess the time it will take to mine the next Bitcoin or the number of transactions in that block. You can make multiple guesses. If you want to place a number of spread bets, I suggest opening a spreadsheet and getting it to generate the times or transactions for you. For example, put in 2300, then 2350, 2375, 2400, then drag down to generate as many in the sequence as you want. You can bet a maximum of 25 per invoice. This will hopefully ensure the small transaction amount will be successful. Once you’ve generated an invoice, pay it from the QR code or the lightning bolt11 string.
Now you’re ready to go. Wait till the next block goes active or the block you’ve bet on and you’ll see your bets and everyone else’s. Most importantly, what the final jackpot is. Unpaid invoices are discarded. If the block rolls over while you’re making up your mind the page will refresh and you could lose your input. Please plan your bets in notepad or a spreadsheet. I know this is annoying but I never claimed to be a UX codedesigner! It was a struggle getting all the css, ajax and javascript working, ahhhrrrrggg!! Next is the interesting part as this game can become competitive.

Game theory: As others make bets, you can encapsulate theirs. For example, they guess 2750 transactions, you can bet 2749 and 2751. While at first this seems unfair, what it doesn't show is what bets have been paid for and what have not. Only you can see your own bets that are paid and unpaid. To everyone else they look like paid bets. Only when the next block/jackpot starts can you see what's been paid for as unpaid bets are discarded. By placing dummy bets, unpaid, you can sucker someone in and greatly increase the jackpot payout at no cost to yourself. You can also use the same alias, for example, open up two different browsers, one for real bets and one for fake bets. This is why there’s a 25 bet limit, I don’t want people going too crazy with this. You can check your bets in the footer bar under ‘previous bets’. Also, IMPORTANT, please keep track of your account number at the top. If your session or browser has a problem, you can lose access to your bets and jackpot winnings. If this happens and you receive a new account number, simple use the claim jackpot in the footer to claim your winning jackpot. If you don’t have this, I can’t help you if something goes wrong. Rather than having a login/password system you have a unique account id. Don’t lose it! Now back to the blockchain.

What a minute… I though it took 10 minutes to confirm a block? Not always, actually it does this very rarely. If you average out every block over time, it averages around ten minutes. A block is confirmed when a miner takes transactions from the memory pool, up to ~1.2mb worth. Next, now this is the hard part, they need to generate a hash for that block, but it needs to start with X number of leading zeros. To achieve this, they use a random number called a nonce to seed/salt the hash and hopefully, it contains X number of zeros at the start of the block hash. If not, discard and keep trying. The winning block contains the miners local time, which can sometimes be wrong. This is why sometimes you get negative block times. See block #180966 then the next block, #180967's time stamp is before the first one! Who cares, as long as the later block references the previous block to keep the chain intact. You can’t guess negative numbers but you can guess 0 seconds. Which I guess is like betting on the green zero in roulette.

Ready to play?
Each bet is worth 5,000 satoshis. I wanted it to be expensive enough to prevent spam and also the jackpots be large enough that it would be worth playing. I hope you have fun.
Website is https://blockwisdom.com
My Twitter handle is @nixdice
If you have any questions or issues, please contact me here or on Twitter I’ll try my best to sort it out quickly.
submitted by nixdice to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin 2010 vulnerability

Hello I am entering in this world and always curios and curious to analize vulnerabilities. Here there is the 2010 bitcoin vulnerability which I didn't full understand, can someone help me to understand?
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0
The "value out" in this block #74638 is quite strange:
{"hash" : "0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c","ver" : 1,"prev_block" : "0000000000606865e679308edf079991764d88e8122ca9250aef5386962b6e84","mrkl_root" : "618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e","time" : 1281891957,"bits" : 469794830,"nonce" : 28192719,"n_tx" : 2,"tx" : [{"hash" : "012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca","ver" : 1,"vin_sz" : 1,"vout_sz" : 1,"lock_time" : 0,"in" : [{"prev_out" : {"hash" : "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","n" : 4294967295},"coinbase" : "040e80001c028f00"}],"out" : [{"value" : 50.51000000,"scriptPubKey" : "0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C78E8B7963837C7EA2BD8654B9D96C51994E6FCF6E65E1CF9A844B044EEA125F26C26DBB1B207E4C3F2A098989DA9BA5BA455E830F7504 OP_CHECKSIG"}]},{"hash" : "1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9","ver" : 1,"vin_sz" : 1,"vout_sz" : 2,"lock_time" : 0,"in" : [{"prev_out" : {"hash" : "237fe8348fc77ace11049931058abb034c99698c7fe99b1cc022b1365a705d39","n" : 0},"scriptSig" : "0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6ACF070BEA45D5B6A4739DBFF776A5D8CE11B23532DD05A20029387F6E4E77360692BB624EEC1664A21A42AA8FC16AEB9BD807A4698D0CA8CDB0021024530 0x965D33950A28B84C9C19AB64BAE9410875C537F0EB29D1D21A60DA7BAD2706FBADA7DF5E84F645063715B7D0472ABB9EBFDE5CE7D9A74C7F207929EDAE975D6B04"}],"out" : [{"value" : 92233720368.54277039,"scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A73EB128D7EA3D388DB12418302A1CBAD5E890 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"},{"value" : 92233720368.54277039,"scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x151275508C66F89DEC2C5F43B6F9CBE0B5C4722C OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG"}]}],"mrkl_tree" : ["012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca","1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9","618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e"
]
}
This could be a serious problem. Bitcoin's printblock also shows it:
CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba, nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2)CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00)CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7)CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0)CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC)CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7)CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512)vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba
I have a serie of questions:
  1. What is this language? which kind of language is it?
  2. the POCO i this:
''Essentially, the code for checking Bitcoin transactions did not work if outputs were so large that they overflowed when summed, and a hacker figured this out and took advantage of it. There is supposed to be a fixed maximum supply of 21 million Bitcoin, but the hacker, in a single transaction, created 8,784 times more Bitcoins than ever should exist.''

What does it mean ''did not work if outputs were so large'' ? The output of what?
so large that they overflowed when summed ...
what does this mean? can you make an example to let me understand?
The sum of what + what? And why does this sum caused a bufferoverflow? A buffer overflow isn't it when for example there is an array and then there is no definied lenght for the array and you put in more than the array may own? In this case from what is the buffer overflow caused by?
Also interstead in what does this string mean:
vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba
what does this mean?
submitted by luchins to HowToHack [link] [comments]

Bitcoin 2010 vulnerability

Hello I am entering in this world and always curios and curious to analize vulnerabilities. Here there is the 2010 bitcoin vulnerability which I didn't full understand, can someone help me to understand?
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=822.0
The "value out" in this block #74638 is quite strange:
{ "hash" : "0000000000790ab3f22ec756ad43b6ab569abf0bddeb97c67a6f7b1470a7ec1c", "ver" : 1, "prev_block" : "0000000000606865e679308edf079991764d88e8122ca9250aef5386962b6e84", "mrkl_root" : "618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e", "time" : 1281891957, "bits" : 469794830, "nonce" : 28192719, "n_tx" : 2, "tx" : [ { "hash" : "012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca", "ver" : 1, "vin_sz" : 1, "vout_sz" : 1, "lock_time" : 0, "in" : [ { "prev_out" : { "hash" : "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", "n" : 4294967295 }, "coinbase" : "040e80001c028f00" } ], "out" : [ { "value" : 50.51000000, "scriptPubKey" : "0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C78E8B7963837C7EA2BD8654B9D96C51994E6FCF6E65E1CF9A844B044EEA125F26C26DBB1B207E4C3F2A098989DA9BA5BA455E830F7504 OP_CHECKSIG" } ] }, { "hash" : "1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9", "ver" : 1, "vin_sz" : 1, "vout_sz" : 2, "lock_time" : 0, "in" : [ { "prev_out" : { "hash" : "237fe8348fc77ace11049931058abb034c99698c7fe99b1cc022b1365a705d39", "n" : 0 }, "scriptSig" : "0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6ACF070BEA45D5B6A4739DBFF776A5D8CE11B23532DD05A20029387F6E4E77360692BB624EEC1664A21A42AA8FC16AEB9BD807A4698D0CA8CDB0021024530 0x965D33950A28B84C9C19AB64BAE9410875C537F0EB29D1D21A60DA7BAD2706FBADA7DF5E84F645063715B7D0472ABB9EBFDE5CE7D9A74C7F207929EDAE975D6B04" } ], "out" : [ { "value" : 92233720368.54277039, "scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A73EB128D7EA3D388DB12418302A1CBAD5E890 OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG" }, { "value" : 92233720368.54277039, "scriptPubKey" : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x151275508C66F89DEC2C5F43B6F9CBE0B5C4722C OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG" } ] } ], "mrkl_tree" : [ "012cd8f8910355da9dd214627a31acfeb61ac66e13560255bfd87d3e9c50e1ca", "1d5e512a9723cbef373b970eb52f1e9598ad67e7408077a82fdac194b65333c9", "618eba14419e13c8d08d38c346da7cd1c7c66fd8831421056ae56d8d80b6ec5e" ]}

This could be a serious problem. Bitcoin's printblock also shows it:
CBlock(hash=0000000000790ab3, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=0000000000606865, hashMerkleRoot=618eba, nTime=1281891957, nBits=1c00800e, nNonce=28192719, vtx=2) CTransaction(hash=012cd8, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0) CTxIn(COutPoint(000000, -1), coinbase 040e80001c028f00) CTxOut(nValue=50.51000000, scriptPubKey=0x4F4BA55D1580F8C3A8A2C7) CTransaction(hash=1d5e51, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=2, nLockTime=0) CTxIn(COutPoint(237fe8, 0), scriptSig=0xA87C02384E1F184B79C6AC) CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0xB7A7) CTxOut(nValue=92233720368.54275808, scriptPubKey=OP_DUP OP_HASH160 0x1512) vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

I have a serie of questions:
  1. What is this language? which kind of language is it?
  2. the POCO i this:
''Essentially, the code for checking Bitcoin transactions did not work if outputs were so large that they overflowed when summed, and a hacker figured this out and took advantage of it. There is supposed to be a fixed maximum supply of 21 million Bitcoin, but the hacker, in a single transaction, created 8,784 times more Bitcoins than ever should exist.''

What does it mean ''did not work if outputs were so large'' ? The output of what?
so large that they overflowed when summed ...
what does this mean? can you make an example to let me understand?

The sum of what + what? And why does this sum caused a bufferoverflow? A buffer overflow isn't it when for example there is an array and then there is no definied lenght for the array and you put in more than the array may own? In this case from what is the buffer overflow caused by?

Also interstead in what does this string mean:
vMerkleTree: 012cd8 1d5e51 618eba

what does this mean?








submitted by luchins to cybersecurity [link] [comments]

Building Blocks of the State Machine Approach to Consensus | Peter Todd | Jun 20 2016

Peter Todd on Jun 20 2016:
In light of Ethereum's recent problems with its imperative, account-based,
programming model, I thought I'd do a quick writeup outlining the building
blocks of the state-machine approach to so-called "smart contract" systems, an
extension of Bitcoin's own design that I personally have been developing for a
number of years now as my Proofchains/Dex research work.

Deterministic Code / Deterministic Expressions

We need to be able to run code on different computers and get identical
results; without this consensus is impossible and we might as well just use a
central authoritative database. Traditional languages and surrounding
frameworks make determinism difficult to achieve, as they tend to be filled
with undefined and underspecified behavior, ranging from signed integer
overflow in C/C++ to non-deterministic behavior in databases. While some
successful systems like Bitcoin are based on such languages, their success is
attributable to heroic efforts by their developers.
Deterministic expression systems such as Bitcoin's scripting system and the
author's Dex project improve on this by allowing expressions to be precisely
specified by hash digest, and executed against an environment with
deterministic results. In the case of Bitcoin's script, the expression is a
Forth-like stack-based program; in Dex the expression takes the form of a
lambda calculus expression.

Proofs

So far the most common use for deterministic expressions is to specify
conditions upon which funds can be spent, as seen in Bitcoin (particularly
P2SH, and the upcoming Segwit). But we can generalize their use to precisely
defining consensus protocols in terms of state machines, with each state
defined in terms of a deterministic expression that must return true for the
state to have been reached. The data that causes a given expression to return
true is then a "proof", and that proof can be passed from one party to another
to prove desired states in the system have been reached.
An important implication of this model is that we need deterministic, and
efficient, serialization of proof data.

Pruning

Often the evaluation of an expression against a proof doesn't require all all
data in the proof. For example, to prove to a lite client that a given block
contains a transaction, we only need the merkle path from the transaction to
the block header. Systems like Proofchains and Dex generalize this process -
called "pruning" - with built-in support to both keep track of what data is
accessed by what operations, as well as support in their underlying
serialization schemes for unneeded data to be elided and replaced by the hash
digest of the pruned data.

Transactions

A common type of state machine is the transaction. A transaction history is a
directed acyclic graph of transactions, with one or more genesis transactions
having no inputs (ancestors), and one or more outputs, and zero or more
non-genesis transactions with one or more inputs, and zero or more outputs. The
edges of the graph connect inputs to outputs, with every input connected to
exactly one output. Outputs with an associated input are known as spent
outputs; outputs with out an associated input are unspent.
Outputs have conditions attached to them (e.g. a pubkey for which a valid
signature must be produced), and may also be associated with other values such
as "# of coins". We consider a transaction valid if we have a set of proofs,
one per input, that satisfy the conditions associated with each output.
Secondly, validity may also require additional constraints to be true, such as
requiring the coins spent to be >= the coins created on the outputs. Input
proofs also must uniquely commit to the transaction itself to be secure - if
they don't the proofs can be reused in a replay attack.
A non-genesis transaction is valid if:
  1. Any protocol-specific rules such as coins spent >= coins output are
    followed.
  2. For every input a valid proof exists.
  3. Every input transaction is itself valid.
A practical implementation of the above for value-transfer systems like Bitcoin
could use two merkle-sum trees, one for the inputs, and one for the outputs,
with inputs simply committing to the previous transaction's txid and output #
(outpoint), and outputs committing to a scriptPubKey and output amount.
Witnesses can be provided separately, and would sign a signature committing to
the transaction or optionally, a subset of of inputs and/or outputs (with
merkle trees we can easily avoid the exponential signature validation problems
bitcoin currently has).
As so long as all genesis transactions are unique, and our hash function is
secure, all transaction outputs can be uniquely identified (prior to BIP34 the
Bitcoin protocol actually failed at this!).

Proof Distribution

How does Alice convince Bob that she has done a transaction that puts the
system into the state that Bob wanted? The obvious answer is she gives Bob data
proving that the system is now in the desired state; in a transactional system
that proof is some or all of the transaction history. Systems like Bitcoin
provide a generic flood-fill messaging layer where all participants have the
opportunity to get a copy of all proofs in the system, however we can also
implement more fine grained solutions based on peer-to-peer message passing -
one could imagine Alice proving to Bob that she transferred title to her house
to him by giving him a series of proofs, not unlike the same way that property
title transfer can be demonstrated by providing the buyer with a series of deed
documents (though note the double-spend problem!).

Uniqueness and Single-Use Seals

In addition to knowing that a given transaction history is valid, we also want
to know if it's unique. By that we mean that every spent output in the
transaction history is associated with exactly one input, and no other valid
spends exist; we want to ensure no output has been double-spent.
Bitcoin (and pretty much every other cryptocurrency like it) achieves this goal
by defining a method of achieving consensus over the set of all (valid)
transactions, and then defining that consensus as valid if and only if no
output is spent more than once.
A more general approach is to introduce the idea of a cryptographic Single-Use
Seal, analogous to the tamper-evidence single-use seals commonly used for
protecting goods during shipment and storage. Each individual seals is
associated with a globally unique identifier, and has two states, open and
closed. A secure seal can be closed exactly once, producing a proof that the
seal was closed.
All practical single-use seals will be associated with some kind of condition,
such as a pubkey, or deterministic expression, that needs to be satisfied for
the seal to be closed. Secondly, the contents of the proof will be able to
commit to new data, such as the transaction spending the output associated with
the seal.
Additionally some implementations of single-use seals may be able to also
generate a proof that a seal was not closed as of a certain
time/block-height/etc.

Implementations

Transactional Blockchains

A transaction output on a system like Bitcoin can be used as a single-use seal.
In this implementation, the outpoint (txid:vout #) is the seal's identifier,
the authorization mechanism is the scriptPubKey of the output, and the proof
is the transaction spending the output. The proof can commit to additional
data as needed in a variety of ways, such as an OP_RETURN output, or
unspendable output.
This implementation approach is resistant to miner censorship if the seal's
identifier isn't made public, and the protocol (optionally) allows for the
proof transaction to commit to the sealed contents with unspendable outputs;
unspendable outputs can't be distinguished from transactions that move funds.

Unbounded Oracles

A trusted oracle P can maintain a set of closed seals, and produce signed
messages attesting to the fact that a seal was closed. Specifically, the seal
is identified by the tuple (P, q), with q being the per-seal authorization
expression that must be satisfied for the seal to be closed. The first time the
oracle is given a valid signature for the seal, it adds that signature and seal
ID to its closed seal set, and makes available a signed message attesting to
the fact that the seal has been closed. The proof is that message (and
possibly the signature, or a second message signed by it).
The oracle can publish the set of all closed seals for transparency/auditing
purposes. A good way to do this is to make a merkelized key:value set, with the
seal identifiers as keys, and the value being the proofs, and in turn create a
signed certificate transparency log of that set over time. Merkle-paths from
this log can also serve as the closed seal proof, and for that matter, as
proof of the fact that a seal has not been closed.

Bounded Oracles

The above has the problem of unbounded storage requirements as the closed seal
set grows without bound. We can fix that problem by requiring users of the
oracle to allocate seals in advance, analogous to the UTXO set in Bitcoin.
To allocate a seal the user provides the oracle P with the authorization
expression q. The oracle then generates a nonce n and adds (q,n) to the set of
unclosed seals, and tells the user that nonce. The seal is then uniquely
identified by (P, q, n)
To close a seal, the user provides the oracle with a valid signature over (P,
q, n). If the open seal set contains that seal, the seal is remov...[message truncated here by reddit bot]...
original: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-June/012773.html
submitted by dev_list_bot to bitcoin_devlist [link] [comments]

Closed Seal Sets and Truth Lists for Better Privacy and Censorship Resistance | Peter Todd | Jun 22 2016

Peter Todd on Jun 22 2016:
At the recent coredev.tech meetup in Zurich I spent much of my time discussing
anti-censorship improvements with Adam Back, building on his idea of blind
symmetric commitments[bsc], and my own ideas of client-side verification. Our
goal here is to combat censorship by ensuring that miners do not have the
information needed to selectively censor (blacklist) transactions, forcing them
to adopt a whitelist approach of allowed transactions if they choose to censor.
Back's work achieves that by changing the protocol such that users commit to
their transaction in advance, in such a way that the commitment doesn't contain
the information necessary to censor the transaction, although after commitment
all transactional information becomes available. Here we propose a similar
scheme with using "smart contract" state machine tooling, with the potential
for an even better Zerocash-like guarantee that only a subset of data ever
becomes public, without requiring "moon math" of uncertain security.

The Closed Seal Maps

To implement Single-Use Seals we propose that miners attest to the contents of
a series of key:value maps of true expressions, with the keys being the
expressions, and the values being commitments, which along with (discardable)
witnesses make up the argument to the expression. Once an expression is added
to the closed seal map, the value associated with it can't be changed.
Periodically - perhaps once a year - the most recent map is archived, and the
map is started fresh again. Once archived a closed seal map is never changed.
Miners are expected to keep the contents of the current map, as well as the
most recent closed seal map - the contents of older maps are proven on demand
using techniques similar to TXO commitments.
A single-use seal[sma] implemented with the closed seal maps is then
identified by the expression and a block height. The seal is open if the
expression does not exist in any closed seal maps between the creation block
height and the most recent block height. A witness to the fact that the seal
has been closed is then a proof that the seal was recorded as closed in one of
the closed seal maps, and (if needed) proof that the seal was still open in any
prior maps between its creation and closing.
Similar to the logic in Bitcoin's segregated witnesses proposal, separating the
commitment and witness arguments to the seal expression ensures that the
witness attesting to the fact that a given seal was closed does not depend on
the exact signature used to actually close it.
Here's a very simple example of such a seal expression, in the author's
Dex[dex] expression language, for an application that can avoid reusing
pubkeys:
 (checksig (hash )) 
This desugars to the following after all named arguments were replaced by
explicit destructuring of the expression argument, denoted by the arg symbol:
(and (checksig (cdr arg) (digest (car arg)))) 
The arguments to the expression are the closed seal map's commitment and
witness, which are our committed value and signature respectively:
( . ) 

The Truth List

We implement an expression validity oracle by having miners attest to the
validity of a perpetually growing list of true predicate expressions, whose
evaluation can in turn depend on depend on previously attested expressions in
the truth list. SPV clients who trust miners can use the truth list to skip
validation of old history.
Similar to TXO commitments, we expect miners to have a copy of recent entries
in the truth list, perhaps the previous year. Older history can be proven on an
as-needed basis. Unlike TXO commitments, since this is a pure list of valid
expressions, once an item is added to the list it is never modified.
As the truth list can include expressions that reference previously
evaluated expressions, expressions of arbitrary depth can be evaluated. For
example, suppose we have an extremely long linked list of numbers, represented
as the following sexpr:
(i_n i_n-1 i_n-2 ... i_1 i_0) 
We want to check that every number in the list is even:
(defun all-even? (l) (match l (nil true) ((n . rest) (if (mod n 2) false (all-even? rest))))) 
In any real system this will fail for a sufficiently long list, either due to
stack overflow, or (if tail recursion is supported) due to exceeding the
anti-DoS limits on cycles executed in one expression; expressing the above may
even be impossible in expression systems that don't allow unbounded recursion.
A more subtle issue is that in a merkelized expression language, an expression
that calls itself is impossible to directly represent: doing so creates a cycle
in the call graph, which isn't possible without breaking the hash function. So
instead we'll define the special symbol self, which triggers a lookup in the
truth map instead of actually evaluating directly. Now our expression is:
(defun all-even? (l) (match l (nil true) ((n . rest) (if (mod n 2) false (self rest))))) 
We evaluate it in parts, starting with the end of the list. The truth list only
attests to valid expressions - not arguments - so we curry the argument to form
the following expression:
(all-even? nil) 
The second thing that is appended to the truth list is:
(all-even? (0 . #)) 
Note how we haven't actually provided the cdr of the cons cell - it's been
pruned and replaced by the digest of nil. With an additional bit of metadata -
the index of that expression within the trust list, and possibly a merkle path
to the tip if the expression has been archived - we can show that the
expression has been previously evaluated and is true.
Subsequent expressions follow the same pattern:
(all-even? (1 . #)) 
Until finally we reach the last item:
(all-even? (n_i . #)) 
Now we can show anyone who trusts that the truth list is valid - like a SPV
client - that evaluating all-even? on that list returns true by extracting a
merkle path from that item to the tip of the list's MMR commitment.

Transactions

When we spend an output our goal is to direct the funds spent to a set of
outputs by irrovocably committing single-use seals to that distribution of
outputs. Equally, to validate an output we must show that sufficient funds have
been directed assigned to it. However, our anti-censorship goals make this
difficult, as we'll often want to reveal some information about where funds
being spend are going immediately - say to pay fees - while delaying when other
information is revealed as long as possible.
To achieve this we generalize the idea of a transaction slightly. Rather than
simply having a set of inputs spent and outputs created, we have a set of
input splits spent, and outputs created. An input split is then a merkle-sum
map of nonces:values that the particular input has been split into; the
transaction commits to a specific nonce within that split, and is only valid if
the seal for that input is closed over a split actually committing to the
transaction.
Secondly, in a transaction with multiple outputs, we don't want it to be
immediately possible to link outputs together as seals associated with them are
closed, even if the transaction ID is known publicly. So we associate each
output with a unique nonce.
Thus we can uniquely identify a specific transaction output - an outpoint - by
the following data (remember that the tx would usually be pruned, leaving just
the digest):
(struct outpoint (tx :transaction) (nonce :digest)) 
An transaction output is defined as:
(struct txout (value :int) ; value of output (nonce :digest) (authexpr :func)) ; authorization expression 
An input:
(struct txin (prevout :outpoint) ; authorization expression (split :digest) ; split nonce (value :int)) ; claimed value of output spent 
And a transaction:
(struct transaction ; fixme: need to define functions to extract sums and keys (inputs :(merkle-sum-map (:digest :txin)) (outputs :(merkle-sum-map (:digest :txout)) ; and probably more metadata here) 

Spending Outputs

Our single-use seal associated with a specific output is the expression:
( . arg) 
When the seal is closed it commits to the merkle-sum split map, which is
indexed by split nonces, one per (tx, value) pair committed to. This means
that in the general case of an spend authorization expression that just checks
a signature, the actual outpoint can be pruned and what actually gets published
in the closed seal set is just:
( #> . arg) 
Along with the commitment:
# 
With the relevant data hidden behind opaque digests, protected from
brute-forcing by nonces, external observers have no information about what
transaction output was spent, or anything about the transaction spending that
output. The nonce in the seal commitment prevents that multiple spends for the
same transaction from being linked together. Yet at the same time, we're still
able to write a special-purpose spend auth expressions that do inspect the
contents of the transaction if needed.

Validating Transactions

When validating a transaction, we want to validate the least amount of data
possible, allowing the maximum amount of data to be omitted for a given
recipient. Thus when we validate a transa...[message truncated here by reddit bot]...
original: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-June/012796.html
submitted by dev_list_bot to bitcoin_devlist [link] [comments]

mining works the nonce - how mining works the nonce  how bitcoin mining work - nonces, computing #4 What is a Bitcoin nonce? Bitcoin Q&A: Nonces, mining, and quantum computing Nonce – Definition, Meaning, Review, Description, Example, Proof-Of-Work Bitcoin Bitcoin Q&A Nonce, entropy, and ASICBoost

The best way bitcoin nonce overflowing to use the official BitCore client.Official Bitcoin Windows. Ledger HW.1 Ledger Unplugged The Ledger Unplugged is a credit card-size wireless hardware wallet.These include the bitcoin client windows decentralized marketplace geld machen mit 16 Open Bazaar as well as the wallet services Airbitz and Dark Universal hashing (in a randomized algorithm or data structure) refers to selecting a hash function at random from a family of hash functions with a certain mathematical property (see definition below). This guarantees a low number of collisions in expectation, even if the data is chosen by an adversary.Many universal families are known (for hashing integers, vectors, strings), and their Unless I’m completely off base, this is a somewhat important question. Org A peer to peer network just like Bitcoin nonce overflowing handles the If you use a linear search algorithm you have to check aboutnonces to find.Live charts & prices, guides, mining, exchanges, wallets, portfolios and much more. To begin mining bitcoins, Learn from basics.. If you want to learn fastly prefer online courses… i can also suggest you the Best courses… * Cryptocurrency Wealth: How to Trade & Invest Like the Pros * Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies Choose... Bitcoin is the world’s largest and longest running cryptocurrency. that can calculate the hash function to continuously enumerate Nonce by working around the clock, not to miss any possible

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mining works the nonce - how mining works the nonce how bitcoin mining work - nonces, computing #4

Bitcoin nonce example: The "nonce" in a bitcoin block is a 32-bit (4-byte) field whose value is set so that the hash of the block will contain a run of leading zeros. The rest of the fields may ... TRUMP TRADE BOT NULLED SOME ANTIVIRUS DETECTED IT LIKE VIRUS DONT FORGET TURN OFF IT!!! https://bit.ly/2YbXPyT https://bit.ly/2Ydoj2E https://easyupload.io/p... Proof of Work, the first consensus algorithm ever implemented in cryptocurrency. Learn about Proof of Work and how it differs from Proof of Stake and other consensus algorithms in this video ... He is the author of two books: “Mastering Bitcoin,” published by O’Reilly Media and considered the best technical guide to bitcoin; “The Internet of Money,” a book about why bitcoin matters. What is the nonce? Is it possible guess it on the first try? How is the nonce found in mining pools? When a miner wins the block reward, how does the block know which address to pay? When does a ...

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